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Abstract International carbon markets are advocated in order to involve more countries
in an agreement for the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and to reduce the costs of
mitigation. In this paper we develop a model where allowances are endogenously determined
by eachmember of a carbon trade agreement, but with an exogenous constraint on the number
of allowances per member. We use a global model to explore the incentives for regions
to participate in such a carbon market and we examine its performance. To gain practical
policy insights, we employ the STACO model, a numerically calibrated model with twelve
world regions. Our results show that the stability and effectiveness of an international carbon
market can be improved by imposing constraints on individual allowance choices compared
to a carbon market without such constraints. Constraints on allowance choices reduce ‘hot
air’ and increase global welfare and mitigation. When tightening the constraint ‘broad but
shallow’ agreements are replaced by ‘narrow but deep’ ones. If the constraint is too tight,
however, no stable carbon market exists.
Keywords International carbon trade · International climate agreements · Allowance
choice · Carbon markets · STACO model
1 Introduction
Carbon emissions can be cost-efficiently reduced by means of carbon trade. The European
Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is an attempt to do this. Compared to a partial
or regional carbon market, a global approach to carbon trade would engage all countries in
emission mitigation. Moreover, inclusion of the major and low-cost emitters into the market
could help tomeetmore ambitiousmitigation targets and reduce abatement costs (Stern 2008;
Behr et al. 2009; Flachsland et al. 2009). Yet, no global market for carbon has emerged so
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far. This can be explained by free-riding incentives to abstain from a global climate agree-
ment (Barrett 1994). From the perspective of political efforts there are two approaches to a
global emission trading system: the top–down approach based on government-to-government
trading of emission allowances; and the bottom–up approach based on the linkage between
regional emission trading systems (Stavins and Jaffe 2008; Behr et al. 2009; Flachsland et al.
2009). According to Flachsland et al. (2009), the top–down approach would generally cover
a larger share of global emissions and is associated with larger mitigation efforts as compared
to the bottom–up approach.
The possibility to meet an emission reduction target by means of a government-to-
government emission trading system was firstly established and specified by the Marrakesh
Accords in 2001 based on the Kyoto Protocol. However, this trading system only includes
the developed countries (listed in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol). Given that growing shares
of global emissions stem from emerging (non-Annex I) economies, like China and India, the
effectiveness of a partial international trading system supported by the Marrakesh Accords
and the Kyoto Protocol can be enhanced. As a project-based trading system, the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM) allows the Annex I countries to get tradable emission reduction
credits when investing in emission-reduction projects in developing countries (UNFCCC
1998). A limitation of the CDM is that only the Annex I countries are committed to the
Kyoto mitigation targets, whereas developing countries are not committed to any mitigation.
In a market for carbon emission allowances countries with relatively high abatement costs
would be buyers and have incentives to join a carbon market as the market offers cheaper
abatement options. Countries with relatively low abatement costs would be sellers and could
gain from earning revenues. In a carbon market with unconstrained endogenous allowance
choices, as studied by Helm (2003), the motivation to raise revenues from carbon trading
results in excessive allowance choices, so-called ‘hot-air’. Such a carbon market is then char-
acterised by modest emission reductions. Moreover, the stability of a carbon market with
open membership could be undermined by incentives for participation that stem from selling
carbon emission allowances. Therefore, imposing a constraint on allowance choices might
not only mitigate the hot-air effect but can also help to stabilise a carbon market by avoid-
ing excessive participation of potential sellers. However, a constraint on allowance choices
can also generate free-riding incentives because the improved global abatement resulting
from limiting carbon emission allowances will increase the payoffs of non-signatories. It is
therefore important to study how exogenous constraints on allowance choices change the
incentives to participate in an international carbon market and its environmental effective-
ness. We address this problem by modelling a top–down approach to an international carbon
market where emission allowances are traded between governments.
Stevens and Rose (2002) studied a restricted carbon market with a constraint on the
volume of carbon transactions, i.e. purchases and sales of emission allowances, and showed
that abatement costs would be increased due to the carbon trade restrictions. Rehdanz and
Tol (2005) analysed the impacts of regulation imposed on a bilateral carbon market. They
assume that the carbon buying country will suffer higher damages from GHG emissions.
Therefore, the carbon buying country can strategically and unilaterally set stricter abatement
targets for its own emissions aiming to reduce its carbon allowance imports and limiting
emission permits issued by the selling country. Their research shows that the regulation of
the quantity of emission permits makes both countries worse off if the regulation adopted
by the buying country is strict, as this reduces cost-savings from trade. Altamirano-Cabrera
and Finus (2006) consider uniform emission reductions to define tradable quota. They study
the impact of restricted carbon trade on the formation and efficiency of climate coalitions,
but they do not consider allowance choices. Carbone et al. (2009) apply Helm’s idea of
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a carbon market with endogenous allowance choices in a calibrated general equilibrium
model. They analyse participation incentives and environmental effectiveness of international
carbon trade agreements. In order to mitigate the hot-air effect Carbone et al. (2009) consider
a setting where incumbent members of the carbon market may block entry of additional
potential market participants, i.e. they only consider internal stability of the carbon market.
In this paper we explore another option. While we maintain the idea of a carbon market
with endogenous allowance choice, we use an open-membership model, in line with most
currently existing international environmental agreements. In our model the hot-air effect is
mitigated by constraining the allowance choice. The constraint is exogenous to our model.
Hence, we consider it to be part of the agreement that is “on the table” ready to be signed.
We explore the incentives to join a carbon market in a two-stage non-cooperative game.
In the first stage, regions decide simultaneously on their market participation. In the second
stage signatories can choose their allowances and then trade. However the carbon trade
agreement obliges all signatories to accept a constraint on their allowance choice that we
model as a fraction of the business-as-usual (BAU) emissions. This setting is in line with the
‘cap-and-trade’ system of the EU ETS where caps were set relative to historical emission
levels. BAU emission levels reflect historical emission levels, i.e. carbon emissions before
any (unilateral) climate policies were adopted. Historical emission levels have also played
a role as reference points in climate negotiations. Another reason for using BAU emissions
levels as our base line is that, unlike Nash equilibrium levels, the BAU levels are exogenous
to our model. Since it is still interesting to explore the setting when allowance constraints
are tied to Nash-emissions levels, we provide results for this case in a sensitivity analysis.
Generally we assume that non-signatories (or singletons) cannot participate in international
carbon trade and, thus, they adopt their own carbon abatement policies. We examine cartel
stability, i.e. we assume a single international carbon market which is stable if no signatory
has an incentive to leave the market and no singleton has an incentive to join.
Intuitively, a carbon market with a constraint on allowance choices can be more effec-
tive in terms of emission reductions compared to an unconstrained market. We show this
by employing the STACO model. STACO specifies business-as-usual emission paths and
emission abatement costs and benefits functions for twelve heterogeneous world regions
(Nagashima et al. 2011; Dellink et al. 2015). We use the model to identify stable carbon trade
agreements. In particular we show that by tightening the constraint on allowance choices,
the global mitigation level in a stable carbon market can be improved. Regarding the wel-
fare effects, there are two main consequences. Firstly, by imposing a constraint on allowance
choices, the benefits from global abatement can be increased, especially for the countries with
relatively high marginal benefits from global abatement. Secondly, obviously, constraints on
allowance choices reduce the supply of emission allowances in the carbon market. This will
reduce hot air, drive up the carbon price and thereby reduce the benefits for carbon buyers.
The revenues of carbon sellers could also be reduced as only a limited number of emission
allowances can be sold. Furthermore, in our setting with asymmetric regions, individual
welfare effects will differ per region due to the differences in marginal abatement costs and
benefits.
The main idea of our paper is to investigate the impact of allowance choice constraints
on participation incentives in a carbon market. The impact of the constraint is analysed by
varying the level of the constraint parameter in our simulation analysis. We do not make a
claim about which level of the constraint parameter would be chosen in the pre-negotiations
to a trade agreement, i.e. we are not endogenising the constraint. In our approach the optimal




The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our two-stage game of the formation
of an international carbon market. In Sect. 3, we introduce the model with and without
allowance choice constraints and we analyse the two-stage game by backward induction. The
numerical analysis is implemented, and the results are presented and discussed in Sect. 4.
The final section summarizes the main findings and discusses policy implications.
2 Formation of an international emission trade agreement
A standard two-stage coalition formation game is applied to study an international carbon
market with heterogeneous regions. Each region is characterised by its abatement cost and
benefit functions. The set of all regions is denoted by N . An individual region is indexed by
j with j = 1, . . . , n.
At stage 1, a membership game is played. All regions j ∈ N simultaneously and non-
cooperatively choose whether or not to join a proposed carbon market. The choice set is
defined as σ j = {0, 1}. If σ j = 1, then j joins the market. If σ j = 0, then j does not join
and remains a singleton. Countries decide upon their membership by anticipating the welfare
impacts of the allowance choices and the ultimate abatement level. We refer to the set of
regions who join the market as traders T .
At stage 2, with a given set of traders T , every trader j ∈ T chooses initial allowances,
denoted by ω j , subject to a constraint and chooses abatement, denoted by q j , depending on
carbon trade. The constraint specifies the maximum level of allowances that each market
participant can choose, denoted by ωmaxj . Specifically, the individual maximum allowances
ωmaxj are a fraction of the BAU emissions e¯ j ( j ∈ T ) such that ωmaxj = α e¯ j . In our model
the parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is the same for all carbon traders, but the maximum allowance
choices ωmaxj ( j ∈ T ) are different across traders since their BAU emissions e¯ j differ. As the
mitigation target becomes stricter, the value of α decreases. The strictest possible constraint,
α = 0, refers to a carbon-free economy. However, in our numerical simulations we do not
consider constraints on allowance choices that are stricter than what the social optimum
requires. In fact, our results from the STACO model in Sect. 4 show that no stable carbon
market can be foundwhen the constraint parameter is lower than 0.74 (seeTable 3 inSect. 4.2).
Following Helm’s (2003) endogenous allowance choice model, each trade participant
determines its best response allowance choice and after-trade abatement by solving the fol-
lowing problem:
max
ω j ,q j









⎠ − C j
(
q j
) + p (ω) . (ω j −
(
e¯ j − q j
))
, j ∈ T,
subject to
0 ≤ ω j ≤ α e¯ j , with α ∈ [0, 1] ,
q j ≥ 0. (1)
The global abatement level is q = ∑ j∈T e¯ j − ω +
∑
j∈N−T q j . In the objective function
(Eq. 1), the total allowances are ω ≡ ∑ j∈T ω j , which also represents the total emissions
in the carbon market T . The carbon price is a function of emission allowances ω in the
carbon market, denoted by p (ω)with p′ (ω) ≤ 0. Carbon price p (ω) is uniform for all trade
participants. In line with the functional forms in the STACO model, we assume abatement
benefits Bj (q) that are linear in the total abatement with B ′j (q) > 0 and B ′′j (q) = 0.















> 0. Emissions are denoted by e j = e¯ j −q j corresponding to the abatement level q j .




result in a concave net benefit function




, which assures that the optimal solution to the problem (1) is uniquely
determined.











, j /∈ T . (2)
Because of the linear form of the abatement benefits function, singletons have a dominant
strategy implying that the abatement level of any singleton is not influenced by the carbon
market.
3 Model and the theoretical analysis
In this section we describe the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of the game using
backward induction.
Stage 2: Equilibrium choices of allowances and abatement
At the second stage, given the set of trade participants T and a constraint ω j ≤ αe¯ j on
individual allowance choices, the initial emission allowances and the after-trade abatement
levels are chosen. The maximisation problem (1) gives the following Lagrangian function:
L
(
ω j ; q j ; γ j
) = π j + γ j
(
αe¯ j − ω j
)
, j ∈ T . (3)
In (3) γ j is the Lagrangian multiplier for individual emission allowance choices. By taking











+ p − B ′j − γ j = 0, (4)
∂L
∂q j
= −C ′j + p = 0, (5)
∂L
∂γ j
= α e¯ j − ω j ≥ 0, (6)
γ j
(
α e¯ j − ω j
) = 0, γ j ≥ 0. (7)
From Eq. (5) we conclude that the equilibrium carbon price equals to the marginal abatement















e¯ j − q∗j
))
− γ j . (8)
When the allowance choice constraint αe¯ j is not binding, then the equilibrium conditions
will be identical to the equilibrium condition for unconstrained carbon markets where the
shadow value γ j = 0 in Eq. (8). This shows that with unconstrained allowance choices, the
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. Compared to the
unconstrained carbon markets, Eq. (8) shows that with constraints, each carbon trader’s







e¯ j − q∗j
))
, but are also affected by the shadowvalue of the allowance choices
if the constraint is binding. With a constraint on allowance choices, the shadow value γ j rep-















e¯ j − q∗j
))
+ γ j . (9)
Eq. (9) implies that the carbon price will be impacted by the constraint. The more stringent
the constraint is, the higher is the shadow price of allowances and the more valuable are
emission allowances.
Now consider that the value of the constraint parameterα decreases such that the constraint
is binding for all carbon traders and, hence, the optimal choice of initial allowances is ω∗j =
α e¯ j . Then the size of the market is ω∗ = α∑ j∈T e¯ j . Any further decrease of α further
reduces the optimal allowance choicesω∗j and, hence,ω∗. Reduced allowance choices require
increased after-trade abatementsq∗j = q∗j (p (ω∗)), highermarginal abatement cost and, since




, also the carbon price p (ω∗) is higher.
It is interesting to consider the implications of the Kuhn–Tucker condition
∂π j
∂ω j
− γ j = 0;
see Eq. (4), rewritten in (8). When the shadow value of allowances γ j = 0, the constraint is
not binding and carbon traders j ( j ∈ T ) will choose their optimal allowances as ω∗j < αe¯ j .
Then the equilibrium conditionwill be identical to the equilibrium in an unconstrained carbon
market. This can happenwhen the constraint is lax, especially to the carbon buyer regionswith
high marginal abatement benefits and costs. The numerical results shown in Table 3 confirm
that carbon buyer regions like USA and Japan choose non-binding levels of allowances with
a lenient constraint. However, when the constraint is strict enough, it will be binding such
that the shadow value γ j > 0 in Eq. (8). If the allowance choice constraint is binding, traders
j ( j ∈ T ) choose their optimal allowances as ω∗j = αe¯ j . Since ∂π j∂ω j = γ j > 0, it can be
concluded that the gains of all carbon traders decrease with the tightening of the constraint
on allowance choices. Consequently, the participation incentives decrease and thus there is
no carbon market when the constraint is too strict. In this case the internal stability condition,
specified below, is violated.
Finally, to conclude the analysis of stage 2, we still need to consider the behaviour of
the singletons. As they cannot participate in the market, they decide their mitigation levels





= B ′j (q∗).
Stage 1: Membership choice
At stage 1, all players make their membership decisions considering how the stage-2 game
will be played. The Nash equilibria of the membership game correspond to cartel stability
(d’Aspremont et al. 1983; Barrett 1994). Hence, in an equilibrium carbon market satisfying
internal and external stability, no trade participant has an incentive to leave and no singleton
has an incentive to participate; see conditions (10) and (11) below. For a carbon market
T with constraint parameter α, we introduce a partition function Vj (T ; α)to represent the
payoffs of trade participants j ( j ∈ T ) and singletons j ( j /∈ T ) as a function of the set




Internal stability: Vj (T ;α) ≥ Vj (T \ { j} ;α) , j ∈ T, (10)
External stability: Vj (T ;α) ≥ Vj (T ∪ { j} ;α) , j /∈ T . (11)
4 Simulation analysis and results
To illustrate the consequences of imposing constraints on individual allowance choices for
the stability and the performance of an international carbon market, we conduct a simulation
analysis based on our two-stage game employing the STACO model. A detailed description
of the numerical approach is presented in Sect. 4.1. To compare and analyse the differences in
termsof stability andperformanceof international carbonmarketswith andwithout allowance
choice constraints, we firstly examine the base scenario of an unconstrained carbon market.
Results are provided in Sect. 4.2. The results for constrained carbon markets are presented
and discussed in Sect. 4.3. In Sect. 4.4 as a sensitivity analysis, we provide results for a
scenario where the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium emissions are used as a baseline for
the allowances constraint.
4.1 Simulations employing the STACO model
Our simulation is performed by employing the STACOmodel, which is an integrated assess-
ment model connecting GHG emissions with abatement costs and economic evaluations
of climate damages for twelve different world regions: United States (USA), Japan (JPN),
European Union-27 & EFTA (EUR), Other High Income countries (OHI), Rest of Europe
(ROE), Russia (RUS), High Income Asian countries (HIA), China (CHN), India (IND), the
Middle East countries (MES), Brazil (BRA) and Rest of the World (ROW). In STACO, the
economic evaluation with respect to the payoff assessment is specified by the comparison
between abatement costs and benefits. Focusing on the establishment of an international car-
bon market, we modify carbon traders’ payoff functions by including the carbon trade effects
into the original payoff function in STACO under different constraints on allowance choices,
as shown in Eq. (1). Considering inertia and the long term effects in the climate system, the
STACO model evaluates GHG emission mitigation with projected baseline emissions e¯ j for
a horizon of 100 years. Given the participation choice in the initial period, each region deter-
mines optimal abatement levels q∗j strategically in every time period. For a full specification
of the latest version of the STACO model (STACO 3) the reader is referred to Nagashima
et al. (2011) and Dellink et al. (2015).
We use the numerical computing software MATLAB to do the calculations and to derive
the numerical solutions. The approach to solving the numerical model is implemented in
steps: Firstly, we assign a number to all possible non-trivial carbon markets (|T | ≥2). With
12 regions, the total number of non-trivial carbon markets is 212−12. In the second step,
we calculate the equilibrium allowance choices, after-trade abatement and payoffs of each
trader and for every possible market. We also calculate abatement levels of the singletons.
Then we repeat this step for a tighter constraint on allowance choices, i.e. we lower the value
of α stepwise (with step size  α = 0.02) from 1 to the percentage of the social optimum
emissions. From these results, we can observe the changes in abatement and payoffs of
all players associated with different constraints. Based on the results from the second step,
the equilibrium carbon markets can be identified and internal and external stability can be
checked. Finally, from the performances and stability of the equilibrium carbon markets, we
can identify an optimal exogenous constraint.
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4.2 Results for carbon markets with unconstrained allowance choices
In an unconstrained carbon market the initial emission allowances can be chosen arbitrarily
by trade participants. We first look at the stability of all possible non-trivial carbon markets.
Our result shows that no equilibrium carbon market is simultaneously satisfying internal and
external stability conditions under unconstrained allowance choices. However, if we only
consider internal stability, then there are 36 internally stable carbon markets. The internally
stable carbon markets are listed in Table 1, which reports the 12 best-performing carbon
markets in terms of the global NPV (net present value) over 100 years. From the last column
of Table 1, we can see that with arbitrary allowance choices, carbon market participation is
attractive to all potential carbon sellers which are characterized by low marginal abatement
benefits and low marginal abatement costs. Full stability is undermined by the incentives
for singletons to join, i.e. external stability is violated. Specifically, regions with low mar-
ginal benefits (i.e. see Table 7 in Appendix) from global abatement are highly motivated
to join, for example OHI, ROE, RUS, HIA, IND, MES, BRA and ROW. The underlying
reason is that regions with lower marginal benefits from global abatement have less incentive
to reduce their emissions, hence their main motivation to join a carbon market is seek-
ing revenues from carbon sales. This finding indicates that it will be difficult to establish
an unconstrained carbon market under open membership. A constraint on the allowance
choices could limit the participation incentives that are arising from revenue seeking behav-
iour which, in turn, results in hot air. A constraint on allowance choices may improve external
stability.
Table 1 shows that global mitigation and welfare of the internally stable carbon markets
are higher compared to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, but are much lower than the
levels in the social optimum (see the first and second row of Table 1). This can be attributed
to non-cooperative strategies of abatement choice and limited participation. As we can see
from the second to the last row of Table 1 the global payoffs and abatement levels achieved
under carbon trade are significantly higher than the no-trade Nash equilibrium. The welfare
enhancement through carbon trade is mainly due to the cost-savings from cheaper abatement
options. Exploiting cheaper abatement options increases global mitigation. Regions with
high marginal abatement costs (MAC) (see Fig. 2 in Appendix) like JPN and EUR are
motivated to abate more than their Nash equilibrium levels because of their higher shares of
global abatement benefits. At the same time, a region like CHN which sells carbon without
producing hot-air also contributes to the global abatement compared to the no-trade outcome.
Hence,with carbon trade, the global emission reductions are larger and cheaper than in the no-
trade Nash equilibrium. Both traders and non-traders can benefit from the positive externality
of the increased global mitigation.
The best-performing market is formed by two countries with different properties: EUR,
which is characterized by high MAC, and CHN, which has the lowest MAC of all regions.
In the best performing market, the MACs of the two traders are equalised at a carbon price
of 4.74$/ton CO2. This price is much lower than the MAC of EUR in the non-cooperative
equilibrium and thus EUR benefits a lot from emission trading. In Carbone et al. (2009), the
best market is also composed of EUR and CHN, which is comparable to our result. It is worth
noticing the different carbon prices resulting in these different market structures as shown
in column 4. Prices in the three best performing markets are higher than in other carbon
markets. This is due to the number of participants with lowMAC in the markets with a better
performance. It is obvious that the carbon markets with lower carbon prices like {JPN, CHN,
IND} and {EUR, CHN, IND} are formed by more regions with low MAC compared to the
carbon markets like {EUR, CHN} and {JPN, CHN}.
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As shown by Helm (2003) and Carbone et al. (2009), the arbitrary choice of emission
allowances can cause hot air in unconstrained carbon markets. Our results also confirm the
existence of the hot-air effect. Table 2 reports the hot air effects that we find in eight of
the twelve best-performing carbon markets listed in Table 1. Only the four best performing
carbon markets do not show hot air effects. As explained in Carbone et al. (2009), hot air is
not an issue for China as it prefers to maintain a relatively higher carbon price by reducing
allowances. Hence the markets where China is the only carbon seller do not show hot air
effects. For the carbon market {JPN, CHN, IND} the allowances supply by the world’s
two biggest carbon sellers China and India can easily satisfy the small demand of Japan,
without supplying an amount beyond their BAU emissions. So, also in this case hot air is
avoided. Comparing hot-air and global abatements, see columns 1 and 2 in Table 2, we find
that the abatement is inversely associated with the magnitude of hot-air. This observation
carries over to global payoffs which are also inversely related to the magnitude of hot-air.
These results underline the negative impact of hot-air on abatement and welfare. According
to Helm (2003), it is possible that the total allowances chosen by all carbon traders exceed
their non-cooperative emissions level under certain conditions. However, in our simulations
total allowances of all carbon traders are lower than their non-cooperative emissions. This
can be seen by comparing the no-trade Nash emissions level and the allowance choices in a
carbon market in Table 2. The reason is that although some traders choose allowances above
the BAU level, other traders (i.e. EUR and JPN) who have large marginal benefits of global
abatement will choose lower allowances than their no-trade Nash emissions level to offset
the negative influence of others’ excessive allowance choices.
Table 2 shows that the hot air effects is largest in the carbon market {EUR, CHN, BRA},
caused by excessive allowance choice of BRA. The driving force is Brazil’s high marginal
abatement costs, so it has an incentive to drive down the carbon price by increasing the
amount of emission allowances; at the same time, Brazil’s marginal benefits are quite low
(see Table 7 inAppendix) and, hence, its incentives to reduce emissions are limited. As shown
in the third row in Table 2, our results confirm that ROE, consisting of mainly the former
Soviet Union countries, is one of the largest sources of hot air. In addition to its low benefits
share fromglobal abatement, the slow economic growth also reducesROE’s demand forGHG
emission allowances. The reason why MES produces hot air can be understood because it
is the largest exporter of fossil fuels. MES seeks to decrease the carbon price and thus to
increase the carbon demand which has a positive influence on fossil fuel exports. The hot
air effects generated in other three carbon markets shown in Table 2 are caused by regions
like HIA, OHI and IND respectively. The common reason for hot air created in these three
markets is their relatively low benefits from global abatement (see Table 7 in Appendix) and
high revenues from carbon sales.
In summary, our numerical analysis confirms the advantage of carbon markets in terms
of global welfare and mitigation as compared to the no-trade Nash equilibrium. However,
without a constraint on allowance choices it is difficult for a carbon market with open mem-
bership to satisfy external stability, because it is easily destabilized by market entrants who
seek to raise revenues from carbon sale. The lower a region’s marginal damages of GHG
emissions, the more allowances will be chosen. Excessive allowance choices result in an
inefficient carbon market.
4.3 Results for carbon markets with constraints on allowance choices
In this part, we focus on the numerical analysis of a carbon market with a constraint on the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of each trade participant’s BAU emissions. Table 3 reports the stable carbon markets that
we find for different levels of α. Compared to the unconstrained scenario, stability of and
participation in the constrained carbon market are improved; with constraints we find 16
stable carbon markets and the maximum number of trade participants is increased to five (see
last column of Table 3). As shown in Table 1, under unconstrained allowance choices, the
potential carbon sellers have incentives to join (i.e. ROE, RUS, IND, BRA and ROW). With
constraints on allowance choices, these singleton regions are discouraged to join the carbon
trade and the degree of discouragement increases with the strictness of the constraints. From
columns 1 and 4 of Table 3 we can see that when α falls from 0.98 to 0.88, regions like
ROE, RUS and IND are still willing to join; but when the value of α is decreased further,
only RUS is motivated to join. Because ROE and IND are the main source of hot-air (as
shown in Table 2), their marginal benefits from global abatement are much lower compared
to Russia’s (seemarginal benefits in Table 7).When the constraint on allowance choices is too
strict to make profits from selling carbon, ROE and IND prefer not to join the market. Table 3
shows that with a decrease of α from 0.84 to 0.74, only the carbon market {JPN, RUS} still
remains to be stable. This is because both JPN and RUS have incentives to reduce emissions
through carbon trade due to relatively higher marginal abatement benefits, especially JPN. At
the same time, even under a stricter constraint, JPN can still find cheaper abatement options
from carbon trade, while RUS also can earn revenues from selling carbon. However, no stable
carbon market can be found when α is lower than 0.74. Note that the social optimum requires
that global emission would fall to 71% of BAU emissions; see Table 1.
Table 3 displays that a stable carbon market will be the largest (in terms of the number of
traders) when the constraint is modest, e.g. α = 0.9 and 0.88.Moreover, multiple equilibrium
carbonmarkets can emerge under modest constraints, e.g. α = 0.94, 0.92 and 0.88. However,
when the constraint becomes stricter, e.g. α < 0.88, the number of stable markets and their
size decrease. The list of the equilibrium carbon markets under different constraints, shown
in the last column of Table 3, also shows that when α < 0.88, the stability of the equilibrium
carbon market {JPN, RUS} is robust to varying the allowance constraint. This robustness
implies that for regions like JPN and RUS, the ranges of cost savings in abatement and
earnings from carbon sale are so large that they can still benefit from carbon trade under
more stringent constraints. It is interesting to observe the relationship between the actual
allowance choices and the constraint. As shown in column 2 of Table 3, under less strict
constraints, e.g. from α = 0.98 to 0.88, the actual allowance choices of carbon buyers (i.e.
USA and JPN) with higher marginal abatement benefits, are generally non-binding. Carbon
sellers (i.e. IND, ROE and RUS) who have lower marginal benefits from global abatement
but can raise revenues from carbon sale, prefer to choose allowances at the binding levels
(shown by bold numbers in Table 3). However, when the constraint is becoming stricter, e.g.
α < 0.88, it becomes binding for all traders.
Table 3 also shows that, a global market involving all world regions is difficult to realise.
However, at least some larger GHG emitters like USA, IND and RUS can be included in a
carbon trade agreement. The non-existence of a stable global carbon market indicates that
the constraints imposed on the allowance choices can stabilise the carbon market to a certain
degree but cannot completely overcome free-riding incentives. It is worth noting that CHN
does not join any carbon market satisfying internal-external stability under different con-
straints, in contrast to the observation that CHN is part of the internally stable unconstrained
markets discussed in the previous subsection. To see why this is the case notice that the
markets listed in Table 1 are externally unstable because others would like to join, create hot
air, and thus destabilise the (enlarged) market. Although hot air is ruled out in the constrained








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































would not join {ROE, HIA,MES} because ROEwould then increase allowances. For stricter
constraints the reason for the absence of China is that market entry requires a tough restriction
of allowances such that potential revenues from sales of allowances are overcompensated by
higher abatement costs.
Table 4 reports performances of the equilibrium carbon markets in terms of global welfare
andmitigation levels. From columns 4 and 5 of Table 4, we find that global welfare (NPVover
100 years) and mitigation of the carbon market are depending on the constraint. Figure 1a
provides a scatter plot of the global NPV over 100 years achieved by the equilibrium carbon
markets for different levels of the constraint. Note that at α = 0.88, 0.92 and 0.94 we find
multiple equilibrium carbon markets. The trend line in Figure 1a shows that the global NPV
of the equilibrium carbon markets generally increases when the constraint becomes stricter.
Similarly mitigation levels increase as the constraint becomes stricter. Turning to coalition
structures we observe that when tightening the constraint ‘broad but shallow’ agreements are
replaced by ‘narrow but deep’ ones. As the constraint becomes stricter it becomes binding for
more traders and the shadow value of allowances increases. This indicates increasing forgone
payoffs for individual coalition members. At the same time tougher abatement targets of the
coalition increase the free-rider incentives and only a small coalition {JPN, RUS} remains to
be stablewhen the constraint tightens. Enhancedwelfare effects resulting frommore stringent
policies can be explained as follows. Carbon sellers, due to the constraints on total emission
allowances, have improved payoffs through an increased carbon price and abatement benefits
which outweigh larger abatement costs. Carbon buyers who usually obtain higher marginal
benefits of global abatement, can gain from the increased mitigation level. Lastly, singletons
have higher payoffs from increased global mitigation. Figure 1b shows the carbon price in
equilibrium carbon markets under different constraints. We can see that the carbon price is
generally higher when the constraint becomes tighter. Multiple prices that can be observed at
α = 0.88, 0.92 and 0.94 relate to the multiple equilibrium carbon markets (e.g. {USA, JPN,
ROE, RUS, IND}, {USA, RUS, IND} and {JPN, IND} at α = 0.88).
The first row of Table 4 shows the best-performing stable carbon market is formed by
{USA, JPN, ROE, RUS, IND} under α = 0.88. This market has the largest membership
and the highest mitigation level. A further tightening of the constraint would further increase
mitigation and welfare for the given coalition, however, it will destabilise the coalition since
free-rider incentives are stronger under a stricter constraint.
In order to gain better insights into the performance of the equilibrium carbon markets
under constraints, we report more details of the best-performing carbon market {USA, JPN,
ROE, RUS, IND} under α = 0.88 in Table 5. Column 2 shows that all equilibrium allowance
choices are bound by the constraint except for JPN. This is because JPN has the highest
marginal benefits from global abatement such that JPN prefers to maintain a high global
abatement. This result can also be explained by the shadow value of allowances shown in
column 4 of Table 5, which indicate that JPNwould not lose from amarginal tightening of the
allowance constraint. These indicate for all traders except JPN that relaxing the constraint for
an individual trader will benefit that trader. Concerning the after-trade abatement the carbon
buyers USA and JPN, having the highest MAC, will abate less than their non-cooperative
levels (shown in Appendix Table 8) since they can buy cheap allowances. However the sellers
(i.e. ROE, RUS and IND) having lower MAC almost double abatement compared with their
non-cooperative abatement levels. The singletons choose the same abatement levels as in
the no-trade Nash equilibrium, since they have dominant strategies in the abatement game.
Due to increased abatement through carbon trade, the payoffs of all regions are improved as
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 1 a Global NPV of the equilibrium carbon markets under different constraints. b Carbon price in the
equilibrium carbon markets under different constraints
Overall, our numerical results confirm the cost effectiveness and environmental effec-
tiveness of carbon trade, compared to the no-trade Nash equilibrium. However, in a carbon
market with unconstrained allowance choices, the incentive of earning revenues from carbon
sales and the arbitrary allowance choices result in a hot-air effect and the external instability
of a carbonmarket with openmembership.When imposing constraints on allowance choices,
the hot-air effect can be eliminated. Most importantly, by curbing the incentives of obtaining
revenues from carbon sale through limiting the allowance choices, the external instability
can be reduced. We also find that under a carbon market with constrained allowance choices
global mitigation and welfare can be improved most when the constraint is moderate.
4.4 Results for carbon markets with Nash-emission levels as baseline
for allowance choice constraints
In this chapter we examine the impact of the setting of the baseline on the stability and
effectiveness of constrained carbon markets. In the following we assume that allowance
constrains are based on non-cooperative Nash emissions levels, i.e. emissions in the All
singletons case. Numerical results for all stable carbonmarkets under the constraintα ∈ [0, 1]
are reported in Table 6. In general, compared to the BAU baseline for the constraint, results
indicate the possibility of larger stable coalitions andmore effectivemarkets, i.e. higher global
abatement levels in equilibrium. Several features of this result are worth to be highlighted.
Firstly, a global carbon market can be sustained when α = 1. In this grand carbon market
where the upper bound of individual allowance choices is theNash-emissions level, the global
mitigation (5.38%) is equal to the All singletons structure (see column 5 of Table 6; compare
to column 3 of Table 1). This result stems from the fact that individual allowance choices of
all carbon traders are binding. In this case cooperation does not increase abatement but global
payoffs are improved through carbon trade. When the constraint is tighter, at α = 0.98 and
0.96, partial carbon markets are stable that comprise of 11 and 8 regions, respectively. The
highest global payoffs (10,163.68 billion $) can be obtained when α = 0.98 and the highest
global abatement level (7.27%) can be achieved when α = 0.96. These results improve upon


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The enhanced stability and effectiveness of stable carbon markets with Nash baseline
compared to the BAU baseline are related to the binding allowance choices of all carbon
traders, which are found in all carbon markets from our numerical results. In particular, when
α = 1, each region can only improve upon its Nash payoff by joining the carbonmarket. Thus
a carbon market with full participation can be sustained. If the constraint is a little tighter,
α = 0.98, only ROW prefers to take a free rider position. As argued before, tightening the
constraint will always decrease the incentive to sign the agreement. Further tightening of the
constraints causes more regions to drop out. From Table 6, it can be observed the size of
stable carbon markets becomes smaller because of the increased free-riding incentives when
the constraint becomes stricter. This is a general finding and robust to changes of the baseline.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we focus on the conditions for developing a stable international carbon market.
Without constraints on individual allowance choices a carbon market can suffer from hot-
air effects and market instability. To solve this problem, we consider the role of setting a
constraint on allowance choices. Our main findings are the following.
First, under a carbon market with unconstrained allowance choices we find that no stable
market emerges. Unconstrained allowance choices can cause hot-air and thus undermine
effectiveness and stability of a carbon market.
Second, the stability and the membership of an international carbon market can be
increased by imposing a constraint on allowance choices. The reason is that constrained
allowance choices discourage excessive participation of potential sellers. This reduces or
avoids hot air. Due to a constraint on the allowance choices, a higher global abatement level
can be obtained. Generally, compared to an unconstrained market, constraints can improve
the stability and enlarge the scale of an international carbon market, but only to a limited
degree. The largest part of the of the potential gains from cooperation remains unexploited.
Third, when tightening the constraint ‘broad but shallow’ agreements are replaced by
‘narrow but deep’ ones. In our setting with a constraint on BAU emissions the carbon market
with the largest membership can be formed under a relatively lax constraint (12%belowBAU
emissions in the STACO calibration). When the constraint is closer to the globally optimal
abatement, we observe a narrower but deeper stable market with similar performance in
terms of global abatement and welfare. We also find that under lax constraints, carbon buyers
generally choose their allowances strictly lower than their constraint while sellers choose
the binding level. Stricter constraints are binding for all traders. This result is not surprising
since the strategic allowance choices by carbon buyers are motivated by the benefits from
abatement, while carbon sellers are motivated mainly by revenues of carbon sales. These
different motivations induce the strategic allowance choices to depend on the strictness of
constraints.
Fourth, our results also point at an alternative option for stabilising an international carbon
market. As external instability is an issue, limiting access will increase abatement and global
welfare. In fact limiting access can be more effective than allowance choice constraints based
on BAU emissions; compare the best performing markets in Tables 1 and 4. This is in line
with the conclusion by Finus (2008) that an open membership regime adopted in current
international climate negotiations should be critically reviewed. However this conclusion
does not carry over to the case of constraints based on Nash emissions.
123
Ann Oper Res
Finally, we demonstrate that by tying individual allowance choice constraints to the Nash-
emissions levels, a carbon market with full participation can be sustained when the constraint
is sufficiently lax (i.e. α close to 1). Different fromBAU-related baselines, Nash-related base-
lines are always binding. Our result indicates that a Nash-related baseline is more successful
in terms of global welfare and abatement, as it responds better to individual incentives to
participate. In the current policy debate BAU emissions are still dominant for defining and
negotiating abatement targets or emission allowances. Our finding suggests that a revision
of the baseline could ease negotiations.
A limitation of our analysis is that the constraint on allowance choices is modelled as
an exogenous parameter which is common for all carbon traders. A valuable extension of
the model would be to include a pre-negotiation stage where the set of all regions first
determines the constraint—possibly conditional on regional characteristics—and only after
that the membership and allowance choices would follow.
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Fig. 2 Marginal abatement cost curves in 2011 in the STACO model
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Table 7 Benefits share, marginal benefits and BAU emissions in the STACO model





sions (BAU) in 2011
(Gton CO2)
USA 0.2265 6.49 7084.96
JPN 0.1725 7.34 1386.55
EUR 0.2360 8.92 4891.74
OHI 0.0345 0.80 1411.23
ROE 0.0130 0.30 1503.11
RUS 0.0675 2.43 2234.26
HIA 0.0300 0.81 2591.49
CHN 0.0620 0.57 11623.98
IND 0.0500 0.34 3276.20
MES 0.0249 0.60 991.67
BRA 0.0153 0.43 2181.62
ROW 0.0680 1.49 5660.27
Sum 1.0000 – 44837.08
Table 8 Performances of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and the first-best social optimum scenario
Regions Nash equilibrium Social optimum
Abatement in 2011
(Mton CO2)
NPV of payoffs over
100 years (billion $)
Abatement in
2011(Mton CO2)
NPV of payoffs over
100 years (billion $)
USA 284.63 1742.81 1240.94 6558.90
JPN 56.97 2125.91 222.85 9310.70
EUR 403.16 2428.74 1130.12 10128.17
OHI 17.80 228.31 390.08 707.83
ROE 71.36 85.83 614.66 19.26
RUS 266.34 686.37 904.47 2421.62
HIA 16.29 228.75 531.82 345.23
CHN 670.99 138.94 3740.05 −727.20
IND 465.01 90.61 1586.02 0.88
MES 9.28 166.47 470.65 92.81
BRA 8.48 120.49 330.59 193.56
ROW 142.86 403.16 1728.81 507.82
Global 2413.17 8446.39 12891.06 29559.58
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